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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant, Jack B. Parson Construction Co. ("Parson"),
a general contractor, failed to produce bituminous surface
course (asphalt) in accordance with contract requirements on
a project situated on Interstate Highway 70 in Emery County.
Parson alleged its failure was caused by an inadequate
materials source and that the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) had misrepresented said materials source.
Parson demanded that UDOT issue a supplemental agreement to
compensate for its added costs.

After a period of nego-

tiations it became clear that no resolution was possible
due to demands by Parson considered as unreasonable by UDOT.
UDOT then ordered Parson to proceed to perform the contract
under threat of default.

Parson failed to proceed and UDOT

declared the contract in default.

Parson then sued UDOT

alleging its faiulre to issue a supplemental agreement was a
breach of contract and UDOT counterclaimed alleging Parson
to be in default.

UDOT also filed a third party action

against Parsonfs surety under its performance and payment
bonds.

Each of the parties sought a determination by the

lower Court of its legal position and alternatively an award
of damages.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following a trial to the Court in excess of three weeks
durationf with numerous witnesses and over 200 exhibitsf the
trial judge found in favor of Respondent and ruled that
Parson had defaulted the contract and was liable to UDOT for
damages.

The Court al$o ruled that the Aetna Casualty and

Surety Co. ("Aetna"), who had issued payment and performance
bonds, was, together with Parsonf liable to UDOT for its
damages to be determined in a later hearing. *
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an Order affirming the District Court
Judgment which it believes to be well founded in both
factual determinations made by the Honorable Peter F. Leary
and the legal determinations based thereon.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves close questions of construction
contract law which turn on a careful analysis of specific

*

Note:

The Court's Memorandum Decision is dated
September 11r 1980. Written Findings of Factf
Conclusions of Law and a Formal Judgment were
signed and filed of record on March 24, 1981.
UDOT thereafter relet the construction contract
to another contractor selected by competitive
bid on the 7th day of July, 1981. Construction
was completed in late 1982 and further action by
UDOT to recover damages awaits the outcome of
this appeal.
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facts.

Appellant's Statement of Facts contains inac-

curacies, irrelevant material and requires this supplement
to make certain that the Court clearly understands the
strong factual as well as legal basis of the trial Court's
ruling.
One key provision often found in construction
cases is a "differing site conditions" provision which
determines what happens when actual site conditions
encountered are other than represented.

The contract

involved herein ("contract") does not contain such a
provision contrary to Appellant's assumption.

Under UDOT

specificationsf a contractor is allowed relief only when
there is a "change in the plans or in the character of
construction" which is directed by the engineer. (Ex. 1-P,
Section 104.02(4) , Tr. 1201-1202)

No change of this nature

was recognized by UDOT in this case.
The contract required the placement of 5" of bituminous surface course (asphalt) with at least 2 1/2" to
be placed by October 15, 1978. Liquidated damages of
$300.00 per calendar day are specified for failure to meet
said date.

(Ex. 3-P)

Prospective bidders are not obligated to use either
material site on Sheet 2B, and test data shown is also
subject to a disclaimer provision.

(Ex. 1-P, Sec. 106.02)
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Prospects 1 and 2 were previously determined to be
acceptable in accordance with UDOTfs requirements for this
project and for earlier projects and were used successfully
by other contractors.

(Tr. 1020-1023, Sheet 2Bf Ex. 2-P)

PRE-BID ACTIVITIES AND PIP
Contract provisions charge Appellant with knowledge of
anything apparent from'a site visit.

The contractor by

submitting a bid warrants that he has "satisfied himself of
actual conditions to be encountered."
102.05)

(Ex. 1-P, Sec.

UDOT merely stated that the "quality" of materials

was suitable "in general" and warned that furnished
information was only "representative" and that "variations"
should be considered "usual" and are to be "expected." (Ex.
1-P, Sec.

106.02)

A federal engineer familiar with UDOT

specifications, this contract in particular, and how
other States provide pre-bid information stated that UDOT's
information regarding Pit 2 was "fairly minimal." (Tr. 1256,
1257)

He stated that Appellant "should have sought more

information."

(Tr. 1262)

The phrase "acceptable in

general" is not a guarantee and does not require UDOT to
"bear the risk" of a contractor's failure to successfully
use the described material.

(Appellant's "Facts," P. 3)

Appellant's pre-bid examination of the project was negligent
and superficial.

This was recognized in conversation by its
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founder Jack B. Parsonf Sr. while talking to Duane Kern and
overheard by UDOT's Engineer Jerry Mecham ("Mecham") prior
to any work.

(Tr. 1290-1292)

Appellant's General Manager

and Vice President John Mont Wilson ("Wilson") did not
inquire who "previous contractors" were that had used
Prospects 1 and 2 referred to in UDOT documents, or inquire
as to previous problems or experience with these pits. (Tr.
414).

Wilson and Appellantfs Materials Engineer Dean

McDonald ("McDonald") visited the construction site prior to
bidding but did not request that Mecham be present during
their site visitf a practice often followed.

(Tr. 444-445)

Appellant had never worked in the project area before, (Tr.
418) and Wilson likewise lacked experience in or knowledge
of the area.

(Tr. 418-419)

Wilson had been specifically

warned of difficulties with Prospects 1 and 2 approximately
a year earlier by Eldred Swappf a retired UDOT Engineer.
Swapp said the pits would require adding a supplementary
material according to his unrebutted testimony.
1468)

(Tr. 1467-

Mecham said he informed Wilson by telephone prior to

bid opening that previous contractors had to blend sandy
"filler" material into the aggregate to meet specifications.
(Tr.

1285-1287f 1293) Wilson denied that Mecham so in-

formed him and claimed he first learned of it at the preconstruction conference.

(Tr. 1752-1753)

Wilson admitted

that he registered no objection or protest about this
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crucial point at the said conference.
133-D)

(Tr. 1782-1785 & Ex.

Both Wilson and McDonald were former UDOT employees,

knew the type of UDOT records available, where they could be
obtained, and that the contract invited a bidder to inspect
them.

(Tr. 417 - Wilson and 635-639 - McDonald & Ex. 3-P,

Spec. Provision, "Bidding Requirements & Conditions, Sec.
102.05 as changed therein.)

Two contractors previously used

Prospect 2, one used Prospect 1 and their records were
available in Price and Salt Lake City.

Appellant's

superficial pre-bid investigation is evident in the
testimony of McDonald.

He stated there was "much

discussion" concerning the test results on Sheet 2B with
Wilson and what they meant.

(Tr. 517) McDonald said he

tried calling Respondent's District Materials Engineer Al
Spensko ("Spensko") but failed to reach him. He neither
identified himself nor requested Spensko to return his
telephone call.

He admitted he knew Spensko would have

information concerning the pits and area geology.

Although

unfamiliar with the area, he apparently was not seeking
geologic information.

He said he knew that Prospect 2 was

located in the Moenkopi geologic formation which is well
known to geologists.

(Tr. 634-642)

Published geologic data

of the area described this formation in detail.

(Ex. 147-D)

Available UDOT publications detailed it as well.

(Ex. 191-P

and 192-P)

Said publications describe one of the members of
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that formation as the "Sinbad limestone,"

Spensko and Swapp

who are both graduate geologists confirmed that Pit 2 was
primarily made up of the "Sinbad limestone."
1472-1480)

(Tr. 1090,

Variations in this geologic layer were explained

by another geologist.

(Tr. 1720-1721)

McDonald, although a

geologist, did not discover this available information or
its implications.
McDonald claimed art trial that Appellant relied on
Sheet 2B and the gradations shown thereon.

His testimony in

a prior deposition was, however, directly contrary to this
and indicated an almost total disregard for this information.

(Tr. 541, 666-667)

Appellant's Statement of Facts

App. - Facts) claims "heavy reliance" on UDOT's representation in Sheet 44 (Ex. 3-P) that Pit 2 was "acceptable
in general" and then asserts that other contractors also
relied on such representation.

(Tr.

1604)

The reference

to the transcript by Appellant is a qualified statement by
an experienced engineer executive concerning the type of
tests a contractor relies upon and those which they do not
rely upon.

(See Tr.

1600-1604)

Other contractors who

testified indicated little, if any, reliance on the said
gradation information.

Altogether they show how misplaced

and incompetent Appellant's claimed reliance on such
information was.

(Tr. 1580-1586; 1632; 1892-1893)

Spensko

explained that UDOT does not make an effort to present
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information concerning gradation results which a contractor
can necessarily correlate to.

(Tr.

1529-1531)

Appellant correctly points out that its bid was less
than five percent below the next low bidder (Tr. 238), but
neglects to add that it was approximately 11% under the
engineer's estimate, or that the contractor who previously
used Pit 2 to pave the highway originally was the highest of
six bidders.
Appellant.

Its bid tfas more than $650,000 higher than
(Ex. 6-P)

Appellant lacked experience with limestone ledge rock
pits.

(Tr. 629-630)

Such pits often create excess minus

200 material; [Minus 200 material is extremely fine grained
like flour.

The material will pass a screen with 200

openings per lineal inch, hence the reference to "minus
200."]; limestones vary in grade and in hardness.

(Tr.

1720-1721r 1090)
Appellant erroneously assumed that neither Pit 1 nor
Pit 2 contained sufficient material for the entire job
(P. 7, App. -

Facts)r but were told before commencing

operations in Pit 2 that Pit 1 could be expanded to obtain
all material from said pit.

(Exs. 132-D & 133-D, Tr. 470-

471)

PERFORMANCE BY,CONTRACTOR
A required UDOT test to determine acceptability of
i
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asphalt aggregate is the Los Angeles Wear Test, or "L.A.
Rattler Test."

This standardized test measures the

percentage of breakdown in an aggregate sample using a
special machine.
may "wear."
403.03)

It is an indicator of how asphalt gravel

UDOT's upper wear limit is 40%.

(Ex. 1-P, Sec.

The L.A. Rattler Test does not measure compliance

by a contractor.

(Tr. 1592-1593)

Contract provision^ require separation of aggregate
material into at least two separate piles.

All material has

had to pass through a 3/4" screen (referred to as "3/4 inch
minus").

When two piles are used, the material in one

aggregate pile must pass through a number 4 screen (4
openings per lineal inch) and material in the other pile
will be retained.

(This allows for variation in the size

of material fed into the hot mix plant and assists in
meeting a gradation specification.)
Appellant erroneously asserts Respondent was
responsible for its "choice of crushing equipment and its
arrangement and organization, etc." (App. - Facts)
evidence Appellant cites (Tr.

The

216-218, 257) is Wilson's

testimony and is his visual impressions and descriptions of
photographic exhibits.

There is nothing therein which

points to any direction in Sheet 2B of the "Plans" (Ex. 2-P)
or Special Provision Sheet 44, (Ex. 3-P) regarding equipment
selection, usage of equipment, choice of either pit,
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direction of removal of material in a pit or a requirement
to even use either Pit 1 or 2. Appellant can use any source
it selects, subject only to UDOT's right to test material
for its suitability.

(Sec. 106.02f Ex. 1-P)

Appellant was late moving its crushing equipment on
site and in commencing to pave.

(Ex. 133-D, Tr. 263)

first pavement was placed October 5f 1978.

The

(Tr. 263)

Contract provisions restrict paving after October 15.
3-P, Sec. 403.11)

Appellant sought and received permission

to extend this deadline under certain conditions.
P and 14-P)

(Ex.

(Exs. 12-

Appellant failed to meet contract requirements

both as to gradation of material and asphalt content based
on random samples of in place material.
P)

(Exs. 37-P and 38-

Appellant"s main difficulty was a deficiency of

aggregate which would pass a number 16 screen (16 openings
per inch) and be retained on a 50 screen (50 openings per
inch) or in an excess of material passing the 200 screen.
(Exs. 37-P and 38-P)

If adjustments were made to reduce the

minus 200 material it threw the material between the 16 and
50 screen out and vice versa. (Ex. 37-P and 38-P)

This

resulted in reduced payment for the item under contract
formula which allows the contractor the option to remove and
replace the material or to accept payment at a reduced unit
price if the calculated pay reduction is not more than 30%
of the full unit price.

If the calculated reduction is over
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30% and less than 50%, the "engineer" has the option to
order removal of the product or allow it to remain in place.
(Ex. 3-P, Special Provision Sheets 30-40)
The average of individual tests of material in stockpile indicated a possibility of achieving specification
gradation requirements.

(Ex. 41-P)

However large amounts

of material with high amounts of fine sized materialf
f

e

represented by individual samples in both piles, which
exceeded the overall average could not have been expected to
combine successfully.
D)

(Tr. 455, 1303-1313, Exs. 201-D, 204-

Mecham warned Appellant of adverse problems to be

expected later in recombining the stockpiles due to their
borderline make-up.

(Tr. 1306-1309, 1320, 1321)

Wilson

admitted that Appellant intentionally builds borderline
stockpiles to maximize production and that this limits the
capability to recombine the stockpiles and achieve gradation
specifications.

(Tr. 419-422)

not uniform in their make-up.

Appellantfs stockpiles were
There is over a 9 percentage

point variation in the percent of minus 200 material passing
the finest and most critical screen as revealed by individual stockpile tests.

(Tr. 1440-1442, Ex. 204-D)

This is

further illustrated by comparing a graphic plot of Parsonfs
tests with those of two adjoining projects constructed at
the same time by other contractors where uniformity is
clearly evident.

[Ex. 219-D (Parson), Ex. 220-D & 221-D,
-11-
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Tr. 1440-1445 for detailed explanation.]

Part of this lack

of uniformity was caused by the manner in which the
stockpiles were constructed, which resulted in degradation
and segregation.

(Tr. 1108-1111, 1391-1398)

Appellants

stockpiles were so borderline in their make-up due to lack
of care by Appellant in their construction that they were
into the limits of deviation allowed for contract compliance
without any further breakdown of material normally caused by
handling in mixing, hauling, placing and partially
compacting, all of which occurs before compliance testing.
(Tr. 1306-1309, 1353)

Appellant's Fact Statement complains

of "as much as 50% waste." Wilson's testimony to the
contrary was that the overall average waste was 35 to 40
percent.

(Tr.

439)

Waste amounts as high as 50% are

normal in District 4 (Southeastern Utah) according to
Spensko.

(Tr.

1520)

Contractors experienced in that area

of the State confirm this.

(Tr. 1625, 1635, 1866-1868)

The

previous contractor using Pit 2 experienced 25% waste with
very careful control.

(Tr. 1626-1627)

Appellant claims to

have expended "elaborate and costly" attempts to achieve
compliance.

(App. - Facts)

Unfortunately none of these

things worked, but Wilson admitted to a number of techniques
that would probably have worked.

(Tr. 457-459)

UDOT sug-

gested a blend sand, but Appellant's lack of know-how was
again demonstrated.

(Tr. 460-463, 1333-1342, Ex. 208-D).
i
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Appellant's whole crushing operation suffered from lack of
know-how.

For instance, the reject system they designed to

achieve a better product resulted in rejection of material
of which 63% would have been in compliance.
Ex. 205-D)

(Tr. 1322-1329,

On production days 5f 6, and 7, a mathematical

analysis of the material put into the plant results in an
expected product with 12.5% minus 200 which is what actual
»*•

test results revealed, but which is unfortunately well above
specification limits.

(Tr. 1342-1343, Ex. 143-P)

Contrary

to Appellant's assertions this would indicate no breakdown.
(App. - Facts)

Appellant was within compliance on produc-

tion days 4 and 5 but made further adjustments and was again
out of compliance.

(Ex. 38-P)

Appellant refers to two problems, "excessive waste" and
"breakdown" of material.

(App. - Facts)

As pointed out

above, "waste" was probably normal for the area and "breakdown" was either not occurring or it was being controlled by
Appellantfs efforts.
Appellant operated a total of 7 days in two weeks
trying to produce an acceptable paving product.

It shut

down operations on October 20, 1978.
Appellantfs demand for a Supplemental Agreement of
October 17, 1978 (Ex. 15-P) was not answered in writing
until February 1, 1979.

(Ex. 16-P)

occurred during the interim.

-13-

Frequent discussion

(Tr. 1343)

Respondent's
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offers and concessions during the Winter of 1978-1979 were
all attempts at compromise without jeopardy to the public or
other bidders as explained by Bert Taylor ("Taylor").

(Tr.

1171-1174, Ex. 105-Pf Ex. 22-P)
One of UDOT's concessions was to core drill Prospect 2
to determine its make-up.

Appellant refers to the presence

of 35 feet of overburden as revealed by these cores, but
fails to mention that they were obtained some 400 feet east
of the existing face of the pit.

(Tr. 1064-1065, Ex. 40-P)

Appellant's Superintendent knew where the "good material"
existed before any work commenced since it was then visible.
He further must have known that it might be necessary to go
as deep as 36 feet "to obtain better rock." (Tr. 1298, Ex.
111-P)

Appellant's drilling company was apparently

instructed to drill to this level as well.
1302^

(Tr. 1301,

Testimony and photographic exhibits established that

material in Pit 2 was deposited in layers and that
additional layers of material are encountered as removal
proceeds to the east and that the general trend of all the
layers is a dip to the northeast which together with the
added layers accounts for increasing amounts of unknown
material over the identified harder material as operations
moved eastward.

(Tr. 1080-1081)

Photographs in evidence

show a considerable quantity of large rocky material in
waste piles which Appellant's crushing system would not
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handle.

(Tr. 1437r 1438f Exs.

216-Df 217-D)

This material

was not reduced sufficiently by blasting and was apparently
similar to the material in the north face of Prospect 2.
(Ex. 124-P)

Investigation showed that material with low

wear test results began at a depth of about 15 feet in Pit
No. 2 as the face existed after Appellant shut down
operations in October 1978, and this became the basis of
Respondent's offer to assist the Appellant by voluntarily
paying for removal of the top 15 feet of material.

(Tr.

920-924f 1047-1050r 1052f 1154-1156, Exs. 82-P, 114-P,
185-D)
Appellant's reference to an inadequate quantity of
material in Prospect 1 has been earlier referred to as
erroneous since it was discussed in the preconstruction
conference.

(Exs. 132-D and 133-D)

One bidding contractor

planned to use Prospect 1 for all the material.

(Tr. 1580-

1586)
Appellant criticizes UDOT for lack of testing in the
BLM property adjoining Prospect 2 on the North.
Facts)
1080)

(App. -

Spensko explained why it was not necessary. (Tr.
Taylor concurred in this decision.

further cites delay in its availability.

*

Appellant

(Ex. 29-P)

It

UDOT subsequently let a contract to another contractor
who completed this project in 1981 and 1982 and the
"BLMn Property was successfully used by that contractor
to complete the work.
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is clear that Appellant could have used the "BLM Property"
if they had so desired prior to formal written permission.
(Ex. 30-P)

Formal permission was received before Appellant

walked off the job (Ex. 32-P), but Appellant wanted a
guarantee as to the quality of the material which Respondent refused to provide.

(Exs. 31-P, 33-P, Tr. 386)

Appellant alleges the Respondent refused to"budgen and
grant a Supplemental Agreement.

The evidence is to the

contrary and shows Appellant to be the one who wouldn't
"budge," but instead consistently held out for more and more
concessions.

Taylor's testimony clearly illustrates this.

(Tr. 1150-1193)

See also Exhibits 13-Pf 15-P, 16-Pf 18-P,

20-Pf 21-P, 22-P, 23-Pf 25-P, 26-Pf 28-Pf 29-Pf 30-P, 31-P,
32-P and 33-P)

INFORMATION NQT REVIEWED BY APPELLANT
Appellant alleges undisclosed information in possession
of UDOT contradicted Sheets 2B and 44.

Specifically Appel-

lant alleges undisclosed test data which reveal high wear
percentages on the L. A. Rattler Tests.

UDOT had complete

records of two previous contracts which utilized Prospect 2
and additional investigatory tests of the pit and of the
nearby "west area." (Ex. 77-P)

The location of this

information was disclosed to bidders.
Provission Sec. 102.05)

(Ex. 3-P, Spec.

Wilson and McDonald admitted they
<
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knew it existed but chose to ignore it.

(Tr. 417, 635-639)

Pit 2 as viewed by Appellant was located on the north side
of the highway.

Earlier contractors started several hundred

feet south and moved north and removed an exposed rocky
material.

(Tr. 855, 856, 862, 934, 1458, Ex.

76-P)

Appellant now refers to isolated test results in a large
mass of available information which Appellant earlier chose
to ignore which show L. A. Rattler results with a wear
percentage greater than 40%. Pit 2 had already demonstrated
that it can produce specification material.

(Ex. 22-P)

It

was established that L.A. Wear test results of the same
sample of material can vary by as much as 3%.
Ex. 81-P, 184-D)

(Tr. 927-930,

It was also shown that since Sheet 2B

disclosed an L.A. Rattler wear percentage as high as 39%, it
was reasonable to assume the pit contained material with a
wear in excess of 40%.

(Tr. 1260, 1531, 1599-1601)

A high

.,•1

wear percentage is considered an advantage since it
indicates neasy crushing."

(Tr. 1591-1593, 1624)

however, require care in crushing the material.
1596)

It does,
(Tr. 1594-

Spensko explained why Pits 1 and 2 were designated by

Respondent and that there was no known alternative.
1012-1016)

(Tr.

Swapp's report concerning Pit 2, which Appellant

refers to, was available on request to anyone and Wilson and
McDonald knew State procedures required its preparation.
(Ex. 89-P)

Sheet 2B and its high L.A.
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meant essentially the same as Swapp's comments in his
report to UDOT to a knowledgeable contractor since W.W.
Clyde elected to avoid Pit 2 and planned to get all material
out of Pit 1.

(Tr. 1583-1587)

Wear factors shown on Sheet

2B for Pit 1 are not as high as Pit 2.

UDOT's 1975 tests

showing a high quantity of minus 200 material which Appellant complains about were taken some 800 to 1000 feet
west of Appellant's work area and of the location of Test
1A.

(Tr. 1007)

The 1975 tests do not indicate that they

were "crushed ledge rock" as Test 1A does.

(Ex. 77-P)

Test

lAf according to McDonald, matches the average of Tests 1,
2, 3 and 4 on Sheet 2B.

(Tr. 543)

Spensko testified his

intention was to show information on Sheet 2B which would
illustrate what the contractor could expect to get from
material in the exposed rock faces on the north and east.
The 1969 tests and the one 1978 test are consistent and
Spensko1s decision not to do further testing as required by
UDOT's materials manual for a new pit is realistic.
92-P, Tr.

1000-1013, 1021-1022)

(Ex.

Spensko further explained

the problem with displaying historical information was in
part due to a specification change which would affect its
value.

(Tr. 1028-1029)

The "good" material was the exposed

rock ledges which is obvious from photographs.

(Tr. 808-

811, Exs. 174-Df 175-D, 177-D)
Appellant raises concern over a wear test with a result
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of 46.7% taken from its stockpile by the State and dated
September 22, 1978. The State employee who performed this
test explained that he performed it for his own information
and that no one else was informed of the result since the
test was not performed according to UDOTfs prescribed procedure.

(Ex. 80-P, 187-Df Tr. 883-901, 936-937)

The said

test result is marked "cleaned with air," and it was
established that sampled cleaned in this manner show higher
percentages of breakdown than those performed according to
prescribed procedures.
Exs. 189-Df 190-D)

(As much as 4.5%+)

(Tr. 1493-1495,

This information also explains why

Appellantfs test results conducted by an independent
laboratory yielded higher percentages than State results on
comparable material and served to invalidate them insofar as
comparing results with State test results.

(Ex. 16-Pf Tr.

1537-1538)
^Appellant refers to Taylor's letter of February 7 f 1979
to FHWA as an admission by UDOT that Sheets 2B and 44
"incorrectly identified" materials in Prospect 2.
"C")

(App.

Taylor explained this conclusion was made before he

was fully informed.

Taylor further explained that UDOT had

really "not identified" the material in question and that
the term "incorrectly identified" was really not accurate.
(Tr. 1173-1174f 1186, 1205-1210, Ex. 101-P)

FHWA's letter

to Taylor commenting on this matter was acknowledged as
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correct by Taylor and it in essence points out the need for
further pre-bid investigation by the contractor.
P)

(Ex. 102-

UDOT had made no effort to analyze the east face of Pit

2 except for one test (1A, Sheet 2B) since it was not known
what a contractor might elect to do in Pit 2 or whether Pit
1 would be selected.

UDOT had correctly identified Pit 2 as

a whole and did not identify any one part of the pit or any
part not readily capable of visual observation.

(Tr. 966-

1000)
Appellant's reference to Spensko1s investigation of Pit
2 as "sloppy test procedures" (App. - Facts) is hypocritical.

This was the third project to use Pit 2.

Spensko

selected an area to test, and the results confirmed previous
test results of similar formations (Tr. 1029); two contractors had already successfully used Pit 2, and there
was extensive information available to anyone interested in
viewing it.

Additional tests would have been superfluous.

Appellant chose to ignore UDOTfs invitation to examine other
available written information and ignored direct verbal
communication warning of potential difficulties.

(Tr. 1467-

1468r Spec. Prov. amending Sec. 102.05 of Standard Spec. Ex. 3-P)

Appellant's lack of care in its pre-bid examina-

tion is the "sloppy procedure," if there is one.

(Tr. 799-

802)
Appellant's claim that Spensko failed to mention that
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Prospect 2 contained silt stone and sandstone assumes that
there was a duty to do so.

Since this material was easily

visible and in addition is described in published geologic
literaturef Appellant could easily have acquired that
knowledge.

(Tr. 1090f 1092, 1095-1096, 1720, 1721, Exs.

191-P and 192-P; 180-D and 195-D)
Appellant presented two geologists who viewed the site
*'
r

after it was blasted and considerable material had been
removed.

(Waggoner & Osborne)

Their statements concerning

"drastic changes in quality in a short distance" and a
"possible fault" contrast with Respondents geologist
witnesses; Swapp who worked the previous contract and who is
well acquainted with the San Rafael area (Tr. 1455, 1465);
Al Spensko who has worked in the area for years (Tr. 10921095, Ex. 176-D); and William Lund, who did not view the pit
but had extensive experience in quarry operations with
limestone rock.

(Tr.

1723-1727)

These geologists saw

little evidence of any "drastic change," or faulting.
Waggoner was reluctant to admit the obvious presence of a
well marked and defined layer of rock obvious in two
different photographs since it contradicted his "drastic
change in quality" and "possible fault" theory.
and 231-D, Tr. 1811-1813)

(Exs. 222-D

There was also some question

concerning the exact geologic strata Pit 2 was located in.
Powell (a UDOT geologist in charge of the core drilling)
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mistakenly labeled the limestone as Kaibab. (Ex. 40-P)
Spensko identified it as the Sinbad limestone member of the
Moenkopi (Tr. 1083, 1090f 1092), Swapp confirmed Spensko's
conclusion.

(Tr. 1465-1466, 1471-1475)

A careful analysis

of all this geologic testimony and documentary evidence
merely establishes that the same material used by previous
contractors to successfully construct two previous projects
existed in the area of the pit that Appellant chose to work
in but that it was covered by added layers of different
material which Appellant made no effort to dispose of or
adequately deal with in its crushing operation.
1464.)

(Tr. 1461-

These added layers were equally visible to both

parties.

(Tr.

1298-1302, Ex. 111-P)

Pit 2 contained suitable material but required careful
quality control in aggregate production.

Appellant's manner

of operation is not the responsibility of Respondent.
Johnson by contrast was careful and selective in the
material and methods it used and succeeded where Appellant
failed.

(Tr. 1460-1461r 1464)

Pit 2 was "acceptable in general" as Respondent states
in Sheet 44. Appellant is responsible for producing an
acceptable product if it elects to use said source, and
Respondent has specifically disclaimed any responsibility
for Appellant's decisions based on such information.
Facts in evidence support the specific findings of the
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District Court that information supplied was accurate and
that Appellant's problems were related to its methods of
production, handling and storing of aggregate material.

ARGUMENT
I
APPELLANTS CLAIMED RIGHT TO RELY ON PREBID REPRESENTATIONS IS UNREASONABLE BOTH
LEGALLY AND FACTUALLY.
A.

RESPONDENT'S DISCLAIMER IS VALID

Appellant asserts that this case is controlled by this
Court's decision in Thorn Construction Cpt Inc. yt UPQTr 598
P.2d 365 (Utah 1979).

Appellant refers to language therein

quoted and which originates in a leading case on pre-bid
reliance upon written information which is ffouza & McCup

Construction Co, v,,Superior Court of San Benito County, 57
Cal.2d 508, 20 Cal. Reptr. 634, 370 P.2d 338, 339 (1962).
The general proposition Appellant relies upon is that:
A contractor of public works who, acting
resonablyf is misled by incorrect plans and
specifications issued by the public authorities
as the basis for bids and who, as a result submits
a bid which is lower than he would have otherwise
made, may recover in a contract action for extra work
or expenses necessitated by the conditions being
other than represented....
(Emphasis added)
This exact language is quoted by this Court with
approval in the case offichocfrerConstr. Co. v, gtate of
XUk&tU 619 P.2d 1378 (1980).
The facts of this case show that Respondent in its
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solicitation for bids provided certain "minimal information"
(Ex, 2-P, Sheet 2B and Ex. 3-P, Sheet 44, Tr. 1256-1257)
regarding two materials prospects often referred to as Pits
1 & 2. Appellant's Vice President and General Manager Mont
Wilson selected Pit 2 after a site visit and a brief
conversation with Respondent's engineer in charge of the
project, Jerry Mecham.

(Tr. 223-232)
r

Appellant seeks to place the entire responsibility
for its failure to produce a specification product upon
Respondent when its choice of Pit 2 was its own, the
direction of material removal was its own, the selection
of equipment and method of removal of material was its
own, all without any control or direction of Respondent.
(Sec. 106.02, Ex. 1-P, Spec. Prov., Sec. 102.05, Ex. 3-P)
Respondent's written representations on Sheet 2B
specifically refer to Section 106.02 of its Standard
Specifications entitled "Local Material Sources." (Ex. 1-P)
This provision is referred to as a "disclaimer" and puts a
contractor on notice that while the materials in a
"designated source" may be "acceptable in general," the
contractor shall "determine for himself the amount of
equipment and work required to produce a material meeting
specifications."

It further qualifies sample information

and warns that variations are both "usual" and "are to be
expected."
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ii d d m y

in

essential.

Such provisions make a contractor responsible

for anything that can be learned from such site visit.

This

Court regognized this provision in the case of piqhj.flpd

CfinBtEttctipn ,CPi .Vi.liflroac P« Stevenson* e t a l . r 636 p.2d
1034 (1981)f and Respondent's exact provision was a key
factor in the Court's decision adverse to the plaintiff
therein.

Earlier in JUiam this Court had found its way

around that provision on the basis of an oral representation.
Respondent did not withhold any pertinent information
in this case.

There was, howeverr considerable information

available concerning Pit 2.

This pit had been used suc-

cessfully by two previous contractors and records concerning
their experience was available.

(Finding of Fact No. 13)

The pit and nearby areas had been tested numerous times,
results of which were available.

Respondent's materials

engineer in Sheets 2B and 44 provided "representative
information.11 (Exs. 2-P and 3-P, respectively.)

The

information presented was viewed differently by other
contractors and there was no apparent consensus of which
items shown were more or less relevant.

(Tr. 1580-1581,

1599-1601f 1622-1623)
The trial Court, based upon the evidence, concluded
that the information provided by Respondent on Sheet 2B was
accurate.

Appellant admits this factf but then claims the
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information was "extremely misleading."

Respondent believes

that this is merely a reflection of the "competitive
bidding" process in action.

No two bidding contractors saw

the information in the bid documents the same way.

Their

experience and knowledge of techniques and geographic areas
are all different and Appellant's lack of knowledge of the
area and of know-how iij the type of materials may be the
reason it failed to "successfully use" Pit 2 where others
were previously able to do so.
In any event, this Court has addressed the very issue
Appellant complains of in the case of R,C« Tolm?n Constt
C0» V» Mytpn WfltSE.Association* 563 P.2d 780 (1977) wherein
the Court stated:
The fault plaintiff imputes to the defendant is
that it did not make sufficient subsurface
investigations and include the results in the plans and
specifications. Defendant's effective rejoinder to
this is that the specifications spoke for themselves
and if there was any such deficiency it was obvious to
the plaintiff; and moreover the plaintiff chose to make
its own field investigations and knew as much about the
subsurface conditions as did the defendant.
Appellant's reliance on Thoyn is misplaced since Thorp
can be easily distinguished from this case.

The three

majority judges in XJisui concluded that a specific verbal
representation by an employee was enough to bind the State.
There was no "disclaimer" attached to the verbal representation.

In the instant case we have a written representa-

tion which Appellant alleges to be falser but there is a
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written disclaimer which covers the information allegedly
relied upon.

Justice Stewart in his dissent in yhorn had

trouble with the majority's unprecedented extension of
liability,

yhoyp was a case which dealt with three issues

on appeal.. Of the three issues the Court failed to clearly
rule on one and as to the other two appeared to be looking
for ways to sustain the trial Court rather than remanding
for a new trial.

In other wordsf it is submitted that the

majority in Thorn was wrong then and the dissent was correct
in that decision and to the extent it may appear to have any
precedential value in this case it should be disregarded if
not specifically overruled.

It is certainly not compatible

with YQtmgr, TQlman and most recently fij,ghlan<3 y, Stevensonr
supra.
The evidence fully supports the trial Court's
conclusion that the information presented in the written
documents is true and the State did not withhold any
information.

Appellant offered no evidence to challenge

Respondent's testing capabilityf nor the results thereof.
Appellant cites a line of cases which place the burden
of inaccurate information concerning materials sites on the
contracting agency.

Perhaps the leading case concerning

this is Haggart Construction Company v> State Highway
Commj.ssioflf 427 P.2d 686 (Mont. 1967).

The Court in that

case in effect held the State had to accept responsibility
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for a materials site which turned out to be unsuitable even
though the State had a disclaimer.

There the Court reasoned

there was insufficient time for the contractor to do his own
investigation.
Inherent in this decision and others similar to it is
proof that the site is not as represented in fact, which
Respondent submits is lacking and which the Court concluded
was not the case here.

(Conclusions of Law Nos. 4 and 5)

In the case of J,,,ft. Th,qippj>Qn $ Son?, Inc> V» S U t e
of Hawaii, 465 P.2d 148 (Hawaii 1970), the Court concluded
that since the State had correctly indicated test results
and made available information in its possession that it
had no superior knowledge.

That the contractor also had to

make a site visit and therefore the State1s disclaimer was
valid.

The Court held that to hold otherwise would put the

State in the position of encouraging careless bids by
contractors who would then expect the State to bear the cost
of his errors.
The decisions in Ifijjoaji, YQUH9r and Highland. supraf
illustrate that this Court has not decided to shift the
responsibility for "differing site conditions" from the
contractor to the public agency and Respondent's disclaimer
is still valid and effective, assuming but not admitting
that the site conditions were different than represented.
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-..'B;. APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO INVESTIGATE INFORMATION
READILY AVAILABLE AND KNOWN TO BE IN EXISTENCE AND
IN THE POSSESSION OF RESPONDENT PREVENTS APPELLANT
FROM CLAIMING THAT IT WAS MISLED
It is not always easy to know what information is
significant or important to a contractor*

Spensko selected

the included information from a large "menu" and tried to
illustrate what the visible ledges were and that others had
used the pit successfully.
44)

(Sheet 2B and Spec. Prov. Sheet

Appellant now wants the Court to look over the "menu"

and accept its choices as to what should have been on the
"menu" earlier.

The response to that is that Appellant

failed to look at the "menu" when it could and should have
done so which was before the meal.
The evidence shows that Appellant and its two
executives primarily responsible for preparing its bid knew
very^little about the geographic area of this project and of
the materials in Pit 2.

Further, they were lacking in

experience with quarry type pits and limestone pits in
particular.
Wilson and McDonald seemed to avoid even the attempt to
gain information which they knew was available.

McDonald's

failure to identify himself or request a return call from
Spensko graphically illustrates this fact.

Wilson's failure

to inquire who the two contractors were that had used Pit 2
and which were alluded to in Sheet 44 when he spoke with
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Mecham by phone prior to bidding is another illustration.
Wilson emphasizes how critically important the materials
were to this projectf yet was not willing to expend the
effort to verify his conclusions concerning the information
on Sheets 2B and 44 when, according to McDonaldf there was a
difference of opinion between he and Wilson over what the
test results revealed.
Sheet 2E has an L/A. Wear Test with results of 39%
which is 1% less than the cut-off for pit acceptance.
Contractor witnesses explained that this indicates "easy
crushing11 but that some breakdown should be expected.
This information mandated additional investigationf but
Appellant's officers elected to rely completely on their
conclusions reached without the involvement of anyone
familiar with the area plus the State's "minimal information,"
^Numerous cases address this failure by Appellant to
investigate information it knew to be available.

As already

pointed out, this Court construed the exact provision which
is found in the contract herein as a special provision and
which refers to information available at the District
Office and at the State Materials Office in Highland,,
supra.

This case involves allegedly defective plans and

specifications (actually prepared by the State and adopted
by reference) which allegedly failed to show the presence of
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wet saturated material.

Information in the "soils report"

at two designated locations indicated that this condition
existed.

Since the plaintiff failed to examine the records,

the Court concluded as follows:
... that Highland had notice of potential
difficulties which might hinder work progress and
that the plans and specifications were not defective
for failure to give such notice.
The U.S. Court offClaims has also addressed this issue
in the case of Fljppin Materials Company Vt V*S*, 312 F.2d
408, 414 (1963) where they state the following:
... The fair residue of the opinion is that a
contractor cannot call himself misled unless he has
consulted the relevant government information to which
he is directed by the contract, specifications, and
invitation to bid. As we read them, the decisions of
the Supreme Court and of this court do not permit the
contractor to rest content with the materials
physically furnished to him; he must also refer to
other materials which are available and about which he
is told by the contrat documents....
(This case cites these earlier decisions: po^leybach
V., P,g.r 233 U.S. 165 (1914); ChlisUe V» P«S,r 237
U.S. 234 (1915); p,.g, ,y. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918)
and others.)
The pi^ppj-p case was recently followed in the case of

American Electric Contracting Corp. v, U.St, 579 F.2d 602
(1978) in which the above cited language was quoted with
approval.
In addition to the foregoingr there is also authority
that the withholding of pertinent information from documents
supplied the bidder does not relieve a contractor if the
contractor's agents failed to investigate information that
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was available but which the agent chose not to review.

This

conclusion was reached in the case of ^eichmann Engineers vf
fitafre, (1973) 31 Cal.App.3d 741. This case was commented on
in 86 ALR 3d 182 at page 272 in an annotation dealing with
"Public Contracts and the Duty to Disclose" as follows:
... that the state is not the guardian of every
contractor who seeks to perform services for the public
and at public expensef for such a concept would be
grossly unfair to^the prudent and careful contractor
who is frequently underbid by a careless competitor; a
contractor who submits a bid for public work which
proves unprofitable because of his negligence in
failing to ascertain all the facts concerning it from
sources readily available cannot thereafter throw the
burden of his negligence on the shoulders of the state
by asserting that the latter was guilty of fraudulent
concealment in not furnishing him with information
which he made no effort to secure for himself. The
judiciary has uniformly distinguished between the
misleading half-truth or partial disclosure and the
case in which a defendant says nothing at allr remarked
the court, adding that the general rule is that silence
alone is not actionable. The plaintiff contractors
reliance on the ruling in Salinas v. Souza & McCue
Constr. Co. (1967) 66 Cal 2d 217, 57 Cal Reptr 337, 424
P2d 921 (ovrld on other grounds Helfend v. Southern
California Rapid Transit Dist.f 2 Cal 3d 1, 84 Cal Rptr
173f 465 P2d 61, 77 ALR3d 398), supraf is misplacedf
said the courtf reasoning, in partf that in the case at
bench there was no evidence of a deliberate or
calculated attempt by the state to create false or
misleading information as to the subsurface conditionsf
and that the present case was not one in which it could
be reasonably contended that the state had a duty to
warn prospective bidders of boulderous conditions since
the hazard and risk of such a condition was readily
apparent as the result of an on-site inspection.
A recent case which illustrates the importance as well
as the reasonableness of this approach is yri-Couqty

Exsavatingr Inc. v. Borough Qi Kingston! 407 A.2d 462 (Pa.
1979).

This case held a contractor responsible for
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unforeseen subsurface conditions where the contractor made
no attempt to investigate the subsurface conditions prior to
bidding.

The Court said:

... In effect the contractor is legally required
to take the precautionary steps outlined in the

contract. This fluty is reinEorceti where no
investigation is mafle ,an<3 an experienced contractor is
involved who hafl access to public documents describing
the mine water levels in,the area • (Emphasis added.)
If Respondent can 4>e said to have "withheld" pertinent
information then Appellant's almost total lack of effort in
securing available information falls squarely under the
rationale of Weichmann and Xri~County, supra.
C.

SHEET 2B IS NOT IN FACT PART OF "THE PLANS."

Appellant attacks the ruling of the trial Court that
Sheet 2B is not part of the plans. (Conclusion of Law No. 3)
The contract Standard Specifications (Ex. 1-P) on page
5 under "Definitions" define the "plans" as "the contract
drawings which show the location, character and dimensions
of the prescribed work including layoutsr profiles, cross
sections and other details."
Respondent concedes that Sheet 2B is included within a
set of sheets which are collectively labeled as "plans" as
Appellant alleges.

Respondent does notr howeverr concede

that the said sheet in any way fits the definition set out
above.

The "work" of this project consits of certain

repairs and improvements to a portion of the entire 22 mile
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project roadway as well as an overlayment of "bituminous
surface course" (asphalt paving).

Sheet 2B merely

identifies two designated materials sites which have been
pre-tested for suitability of the material and which are
made available for the contractor to use at his election.
The said sheet contains a reference to Section 106.02 of the
Standard Specifications (Exhibit 1).

This section is

entitled "Local Materials Sources" and a reading of that
section says that "possible sources of local materials may
be designated on the plans and described in the special
provisions." The section then proceeds to make clear the
fact that "designated sources" are merely optional at the
contractor's discretion.

Nothing in Sheet 2B (Ex. 2-P) or

Special Provision Sheet 44 (Ex. 3-P) in any way obligates
the contractor to use said "designated sources." Sheet 2B
does not describe or locate any portion of the paving work
or any other contract work item.
admitted this.

(Tr. 427-428)

(Wilson reluctantly

The plans would be fully

complete and would still completely describe the "locationf
character and dimensions of the prescribed work" if Sheet 2B
were not included.
Appellant clearly has no right to rely upon Sheet 2B as
a part of the "plans" since said sheet is merely informational and the State has made it clear that it does not
intend to be bound by the information shown except that
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the tests were properly conducted and the results accurately
recorded, but any conclusions the contractor draws from the
information are not the responsibility of Respondent,
The Special Provision, Sheet 44, which Appellant claims
to rely uponf has language in the last paragraph which
Respondent submits is dispositive of this issue*

It refers

to additional information on the "... materials prospect and
test hole data sheet aggQIBPflJiying, the, Pl?ns for this
project."

(Emphasis added.)

This indicates that Sheet 2B

is not considered a part of the "plans."
The trial Court likewise in Conclusions of Law Nos.
5 and 6 concludes that the information displayed on Sheet
2B went unchallenged as to testing procedures by Appellant
and that Respondent did not warrant the quality or
suitability of materials in Pits 1 and 2, and further
incorporates the language of Respondent's disclaimer which
effectively forecloses any right of reliance by Appellant
on Sheet 2B.
Contrary to Appellant's assertion that the trial Court
erred in concluding Sheet 2B was not part of the plansf
Appellant offers nothing to challenge this conclusion except
that Sheet 2B is "held out" to be part of the plans. The
fact is the trial Court is correctf Sheet 2B is not a part
of the plans.
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II
PARSON IS NOT ENTITLED TO A SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENT
A.

APPELLANTS FAILURE TO PRODUCE SPECIFICATION
MATERIAL IS DUE TO PARSON'S LACK OF KNOW-HOW
AND IS NOT DUE TO ANY MATERIAL CHANGE IN PIT 2

There is abundant factual testimony to demonstrate that
Parson was unable to produce a specification product in Pit
2 because of its own negligence and lack of know-how.
Appellant had no experience in the southeastern part of
Utah, and very little knowledge of either rock quarries or
limestone rock in particular.

Other contractors and

witnesses explained problems associated with both quarry
operations and limestone quarries in particular.
Appellant made no effort to exercise reasonable care in
crushing, stockpiling or handling of its aggregate.

Appel-

lant produced a product with little or no margin for
deterioration or "break-down" in the material.
Appellant's blasting operations did not adequately
reduce the hardest materials in size so that they could be
incorporated in the crushing system. (Tr. 1401-1406f 14371438 and Ex. 216-D)

Appellant knew that the best material

existed at the bottom of the east face when it began
operationsf yet made no effort to separate out or remove
less desirable material overlaying the "good hard materialw
at the bottom of the east face.

-37Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

Appellant's stockpiles were poorly constructed and
located causing segregation and ineffecient handling.

(Tr.

13i9-1322f 1391-1400, Ex. 214-D and 215-D)
Appellant's efforts to correct problems by use of a
blend material were minimal and demonstrated incompetence as
tests show they were rejecting the same material they were
introducing in the mix which failed to cause any improvement
in the results.
The foregoing items fully support the Court's Finding
of Fact No. 20 and Conclusions of Law based thereon.
Appellant ignored warnings by Mecham that previous
contractors had some problems in meeting specificationas and
by Eldred Swapp in an earlier conversation warning of
problems with the "quarry pits" on the San Rafael.

They

further failed to heed Mecham's warnings based on results of
"courtesy tests" on the aggregate as it was produced.
^The most obvious indicator of Parson's lack of know-how
is the fact that previous contractors succeeded where Appellant failed in producing a specification product.

(Previous

contractors produced one stockpile and lacked the advantage
that multiple piles with different size material gave to a
contractor.)
Appellant waited so long to begin crushing operations
that it had little time to adjust for gradation problems.
With the extra cost and problems association with paving in
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cooler weather Appellant apparently decided to terminate
operations and blame Respondent for its problems rather than
find a way to meet contract requirements,
B.

CONDITIONS ENCOUNTERED IN PIT 2 DO NOT JUSTIFY
RELIEF UNDER SECTION 104.02 OF THE STANDARD
SPECIFICATIONS.

One of Appellant1$ central arguments is that there was
either a material misrepresentation by UDOT or a material
change in the contract as a result of conditions encountered
in Pit 2 which would justify a supplemental agreement to
cover Parson's additional costs.

Appellant attacks various

rulings of the trial Court with perhaps the central focus of
the attack being on Conclusion of Law No. 9 which essentially holds a change in a material source does not constitute
a "change in the plans or in the character of construction"
such that it would justify a supplemental agreement.

Appel-

lant relies on the Thorp case to support this proposition.
This appears to be a distortion of that ruling.
Appellant obviously assumes that Section 104.02(4) is
something that it is not.

Said section merely authorizes a

supplemental agreement if a change in the plans or in the
character of construction which is ordered l?v the engineer
results in added costs to the contractor and provided
further the contractor requests such relief.
is not a "changed conditions" provision.
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argument, Appellant cites the case of pattpye yt Metr°-

pplitan Sewer Commissi en P £ Milwaukeer 454 F.2d 537 (7th
Cir.

1971) in support of its position.

They further

represent that the Court in pat;t;ore was interpreting a
"similar provision" to Section 104.02. This is not truef
the provision in Fatfrorp is a true changed condition
provision which covers "subsurface or latent condtion
f

materially different than those shown in the drawings."
The provision reads as follows:
Changed conditions. Should the contractor
encounterr or the sewerage commission discover during
the progress of the work, subsurface and (or) latent
conditions at the site materially differing from those
shown on the drawings or indicated in the specifications, the attention of the engineer shall be
called immediately to such conditions before they are
disturbed. The engineer shall thereon promptly
investigate the conditions, and if he finds that they
materially differ from those shown on the drawings, or
indicated in the specifications, he shall at once make
said changes in the drawings and (or) specifications as
he may find necessary and any increase or decrease of
cost and (or) difference in time resulting from such
changes shall be adjusted as provided in paragraph 19
of this contract.
As can be seen, this is vastly different than Section
104.02 since it covers "latent or subsurface conditions."
The Respondent's engineer is not allowed to compensate
a contractor having difficulty on a project unless the
difficulty results from a directed change by the engineer to
either the plans or the character of construction.
Obviously, without the engineer's involvement in actively
directing the contractor to take an action in conflict with
-40-
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the "plans or character of construction" the provision does
not apply.

UDOT specifications are silent on "changed

conditions."
This Court has previously construed Section 104.02
strictly according to its plain language in an earlier decision involving Appellant in the case of ?ack B.

parson

CQnsttUCtipn QQ* .Vt .Stjtte, Qf PUhr 552 P.2d 107 (1976).

The

Court in that decision states in pertinent language as
follows:
... In making a determination of whether or not
there was an overrun or underrun ... the language of
the above referred to specifications is controlling.
The language is clear and unambiguous....
Respondent submits that the pl^in l^ngpage of Section
104.02 rules out any possibility of its interpretation as a
"changed condition" or "differing site condition" provision.
It is obvious that Conclusion of Law No. 9 is well supported
factually as well as legally.
Appellant further asserts that since Respondent offered
to pay Appellant for removal of 15 feet of overburden, that
this constitutes an admission of liability and a recognition
that conditions were different in the pit than represented.
The fact is that UDOT made no representatins of such nature.
UDOT represented on one test the conditions to be encountered on the east face of the pit as far as the exposed ledge
was concerned.

(Test lAf Sheet 2B and Ex. 2-P)

The 15 feet

of overburden was easily visible as photographs in evidence
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illustrate and as testimony has also established.
P, Tr. 1048-1058)

(Ex. 114-

As operations proceeded to the east

additional layers of unidentified material overlay the
layers of material which were evident prior to the beginning
of operations.

This is illustrated by photographs of the

roadway cut which adjoins Pit 2 on the south.

(Exs."225-D,

226-D, Tr. 1536-1537) ,It is therefore obvious that UDOT
made no representations as to the material that Parson
encountered, except as to the exposed faces.

The proposed

offer by UDOT was clearly made in the spirit of compromise
and in an effort to get the Appellant back to work since
UDOT wanted the project completed.

(Exs. 20-P, 22-P)

When it became obvious that Appellant would not be
satisfied with this offer, UDOT then directed Appellant to
proceed with its contract.

Appellant tries to misconstrue

this direction into some kind of a direct order for the
Appellant to seek other sources when the correspondence can
easily be interpreted to include Pit 1 which Appellant never
attempted to use as well as other areas of Pit 2 which were
in the right-of-way, and which were available for use.

In

fact, Mecham's letter of May 29, 1979 ( Ex. 28-P) in essence
suggests that Appellant refer to Section 106.02 entitled
"Local Materials Sources" (Ex. 1-P) and consider "all the
options available to you." The options reasonably to be
construed at that time are as follows:

-42-
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1.

Continue in Pit 2 by going to the east, to the

west, or north into the "BLM" property which was then
available.
2.

Go to Pit 1.

3.

Find an acceptable alternate source; or

4*

Any combination of the three.

Bert Taylor's explanation of these matters is
r

reasonable and accurately summarizes UDOT's position during
the period of negotiation which was essentially that Appellant was not entitled to a supplemental agreement for the
simple failure of Appellant to make specification material
out of Pit 2, but UDOT was willing to try and find ways to
resolve the problem so long as those ways did not include an
ultimate increase in costs to the public.

There was cer-

tainly no admission that UDOT felt itself responsible for
Appellant's failure to produce adequate material in Pit 2.
(Tr.^1177-1186)
Appellant implies that there is something improper or
incorrect about Respondent's suggestion that it should have
contacted other contractors.

Obviously, Respondent is aware

of the noncollusion provision in its bidding documents.
There was, howeverr ample opportunity for Appellant to inquire of the engineer as to the contractors who had previously worked in the areaf and since Strong Construction had
worked in Pit 1 and was no longer bidding jobs of the nature
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involved heref there would have been nothing improper in
making a contact with respresentatives of that company.
W. W. Clyde in fact did so as Mr. Blaine Clyde testified.
Other contractor witnesses who testified described how they
kept up with what other contractors were doing and the
importance of this information.

(Tr. 1864, 1865)

Appellant states t^hat "under Thornf the right
of recovery is based on implied warranty."

Evidence in the

record supports the Court's conclusions that pertinent
contract representations are correct.

The Appellant's

incompetence in its operations is also adequately supported
by the evidence.
applicable.

The ruling in Tfroyn is therfore not

yhoyp dealt with a verbal misrepresentation

which doesn't exist here and won't support Appellant's
theory anyway, as already pointed out in argument above.
Appellant further relies on the case of fitoqk ^ d
GrQVer Ingt V«,UtS> 493 F.2d 629 (Court of Claims, 1974).
(It alleges that this case is extremely close to the case at
hand.)

Respondent disagrees as that is a federal case and

it involves a true "changed conditions" clause.
It also discusses "mutual mistake of fact" as a basis
for allowing recovery.

In the instant case there was no

mistake of fact by Respondent since it never represented to
a bidder the exact conditions in either of the material
sources.

This is evident from the number, location, and
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type of tests conductedf as well as the disclaimer provision
under which the information was supplied.

The brief

narrative found in Sheet 44 invited further inquiry or
investigation.

In StQCK, and Gr.QVer supra, there was

evidence of a very careful pre-bid investigation by the
contractor which is in stark contrast to the facts in this
case.

In fact, even a''cursory reading of said case reveals

little similarity between it and this case either legally or
factually.
CPWaPSIPN
Respondent respectfully submits that the Judgment of
the Honorable Peter F. Leary in this matter should be
sustained.

It is well founded factually and legally.

Obviously, the parties to this litigation are very
concerned about the ultimate outcome of this matter.

The

record reflects the concern of the Trial Judge as well.
Appellant has attempted to place full responsibility
for its failure to perform upon Respondent and asks that the
Court grant relief upon its allegations that Respondent
misrepresented "designated materials sources."

It further

would have this Court disregard the evidence that Appellant's lack of performance was due to its own negligence or
incompetence.

Likewise, it asserts that this Court should

disregard the written disclaimer which covers the informa-
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tion provided to bidders by Respondent.
Appellant in its Conclusion to its Brief on Appeal pays
lip service to the concept of competitive bidding but then
goes on to state what it perceives is the government's
responsibility.
Appellant says nothing about the contractor's
responsibility which i^* to make a careful site visit and
reasonable investigation of bid documents and a careful
analysis prior to submitting a bid.

Further, the successful

bidder then has the duty of performing in a good workmanlike
manner, promptly, and in accordance with the plans and
specifications.
Appellant obviously failed in its responsibility at
every stage; its pre-bid investigation was superficial; its
analysis of bid documents lacked competence as confirmed by
its owner and founder; its real performance began far too
late in the season and was obviously disorganized; its chief
problem in failing to meet gradation requirements was due to
its lack of care and competence in selecting materialf in
crushing itr in handlingr in mixingf and in hauling and
placing; its attempts at correcting problems were halfheartedf disorganized and incompetent.
From a legal standpoint Appellant failed to investigate
available information which it knew existed and is thus
foreclosed from claiming that it was misled since even a

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-46-

cursory review of said information would have disclosed that
its optimistic assumptions based on its superficial review
was erroneous.

In addition, Appellant's Vice President

Wilson had been specifically warned concerning possible
gradation problems by two State officials which put Wilson
on a duty to inquire further.

Finallyr Respondent's in-

formation as set out in pre-bid documents was in fact
true.

Its disclaimer even though somewhat generalf is

adequate to place the burden on Appellant which is in
accordance with virtually every significant construction law
case in this State except for the split decision in Thorn,
supra.

Contrary to Appellant's assertions there is no

"changed conditions" provision which applies in this casef
nor do the facts justify any legal relief.
The competitive bid process does not mean that a
contractor can expect to be rescued for claiming misrepresentation unless his reliance was "reasonable."

Ob-

viously, in Utah this means that representations in prebid documents convered with a disclaimer are not a
guarantee.
Finally, the Appellant has failed to explain how
Respondent's pre-bid documents can be considered erroneous
since it failed to produce a specification product when
others using the same source were able to.
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The Judgment should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of June, 1983
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

LELi
Assistant Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF HAIMNg
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent were mailed first class, postage prepaidf to John P. Ashton and James A. Boevers of Prince,
Yeates & Geldzahler, Third Floor Mony Plazar 424 East Fifth
South, Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111, this 3rd day of June,
1983.
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